A redated post.
How would the discussion begin in response to a position like this? This is body autonomy with a vengeance. For this guy, the principle of body autonomy trumps the right to life.
1. I'm entitled to kill anything, and anyone, which is located inside my body, no matter what or who it is. If all the people in the whole world--innocent and guilty, unborn and already-born, great and small, rich and poor, smart and stupid--were assembled somewhere inside my body, along with Baby Jesus, Almighty God, and The Flying Spaghetti Monster, then I'd be entitled to holocaust 'em at will. That's part of the meaning of the word "my" in the phrase "my body".
2. If something or someone is living by means of my body's life-support functions, on food I eat and digest and on air I breathe, I'm entitled to stop that anytime. The life-support machine is part of my body, so it's mine to switch off.
3. If someone is getting ready to subject me to major medical/surgical trauma, I'm entitled to prevent that by killing the someone. You know, just as a man would be. Even if they're doing so unintentionally. It's not punishment; it's protection.
Which are the moral judgments?
How do were determine which of these are moral judgments?
1) Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
2) It is rude to belch after dinner.
3) Eat lots of fruits and vegetables.
4) Drive on the right side of the road.
5) Don't lie under oath.
6) Buy low, sell high.
1) Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
2) It is rude to belch after dinner.
3) Eat lots of fruits and vegetables.
4) Drive on the right side of the road.
5) Don't lie under oath.
6) Buy low, sell high.
Objectivity and Contradiction
One way of testing whether something is objective is whether the law of noncontradiction applies to it. For example, if I say "The cat is on the mat" and you say "the cat is not on the mat:, once we figure out which cat and which mat, only one of us can be right, and the other has to be wrong. However if I say "McDonalds has better burgers than BK," and you say "No, BK's are better," we haven't really contradicted one another, because each is making truthful claims aboout our own taste buds. We can't apply the law of non-contradiction.
What about
"Abortion is always wrong, except in cases where the mother's life is in danger."
If one person asserts that, and the other denies it, does one person have to be wrong? Can we apply the law of non-contradicion?
What about
"Abortion is always wrong, except in cases where the mother's life is in danger."
If one person asserts that, and the other denies it, does one person have to be wrong? Can we apply the law of non-contradicion?
Reply To Vallicella on SB 1070
I argued that SB 1070 isn’t viable because there are no sensible criteria for “reasonable suspicion” that a person is here illegally that are non-racial. Vallicella responds that there is a clause in the bill about stops made "during any legitimate contact made by an official . . . ." I take it what he is getting at here is that the officer has to be going about legitimate police business of some kind other than what is related to checking immigration status. I take it he is interpreting that clause to mean that, pace Obama, the law wouldn’t permit the official to stop someone who was walking their dog and looked Hispanic. The trouble is that the law actually made being here illegally itself a state crime, so it would seem to me that any attempt to determine whether the crime of being here illegally had been committed would constitute a legitimate contact.
In the example Vallicella uses, the person has been pulled over for a missing tail light, and is, as a matter of routine, is asked for his driver’s license. At that point, if the person fails to produce a license, speaks no English, and can’t produce registration or proof of insurance, the officer might then have reasonable suspicion for checking papers and attempting to determine immigration status. Now he doesn’t mention the role of skin color in determining whether the inquiry is made, nor does he mention whether or not he thinks I should be expected to produce immigration papers if I were similarly stopped, although, of course, I can speak English. Or, what if a German were stopped, who doesn’t speak English but only German?
Now this is somewhat different from his example of RICO statutes and Italians, in the sense that it does seem to involve the use of race or ethnicity as a criterion for determining whether an immigration investigation commences or not. Is it OK so long as it isn’t the only criterion, or even the primary criterion?
Notice also that Vallicella has chosen an example where the officer, as a matter of routine, checks for a driver’s license. In some cases of police activity, checking the DL is not involved. My example from the original post comes for experience living next to Hispanics who sometimes played their Spanish language music too loud late at night. We sometimes call the police when that happened. If the police were to come out and find that the people were Hispanic and playing music in Spanish, would this constitute “reasonable suspicion” that the people were here illegally?
So far, I have not had my suspicions allayed that the law has been crafted well enough to avoid either being a completely ineffective lawsuit magnet, or a racially prejudicial. My suspicion is that this will cause more trouble than it's worth to citizens and legal aliens who happen to be Hispanic.
In the example Vallicella uses, the person has been pulled over for a missing tail light, and is, as a matter of routine, is asked for his driver’s license. At that point, if the person fails to produce a license, speaks no English, and can’t produce registration or proof of insurance, the officer might then have reasonable suspicion for checking papers and attempting to determine immigration status. Now he doesn’t mention the role of skin color in determining whether the inquiry is made, nor does he mention whether or not he thinks I should be expected to produce immigration papers if I were similarly stopped, although, of course, I can speak English. Or, what if a German were stopped, who doesn’t speak English but only German?
Now this is somewhat different from his example of RICO statutes and Italians, in the sense that it does seem to involve the use of race or ethnicity as a criterion for determining whether an immigration investigation commences or not. Is it OK so long as it isn’t the only criterion, or even the primary criterion?
Notice also that Vallicella has chosen an example where the officer, as a matter of routine, checks for a driver’s license. In some cases of police activity, checking the DL is not involved. My example from the original post comes for experience living next to Hispanics who sometimes played their Spanish language music too loud late at night. We sometimes call the police when that happened. If the police were to come out and find that the people were Hispanic and playing music in Spanish, would this constitute “reasonable suspicion” that the people were here illegally?
So far, I have not had my suspicions allayed that the law has been crafted well enough to avoid either being a completely ineffective lawsuit magnet, or a racially prejudicial. My suspicion is that this will cause more trouble than it's worth to citizens and legal aliens who happen to be Hispanic.
Hasker on Dennett's Dangerous Dogmatic Presupposition
William Hasker, in the preface to The Emergent Self,(Cornell, 1999) x, wrote:
But there is one kind of apporach to these issues that is unlikely to be affected by the views and arguments contained in this book. As an example of this approach, (though by no means not the only one) we may take Daniel Dennett, as he presents himself in his essay in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 1995). He tells us taht, having come to distrust the methods employed by other philosophers, he decided that "before I could trust my intuitions about the mind, I had to figure out how the brain could possibly accomplish the mind's work." This means accepting, right from the outset that the brain is a "syntactic engine" that mimics the competence of "semantic engines. (How we mere semantic engines could ever know what a semantic engine might be is not addressed). All this is dictated by an "initial allegiance....to the physical sciences and the third-person point of view," an allegiance which in turn is justified by appeal to an evolutionary perspective. The foundational commitment to mechanistic materialism is unmistakable. This commitment is subsequently refined and elaborated, but it is never subjected to a fundamental re-evaluation; rather, data that conflict with it are dismissed as illusory. ("This conviction that I, on the inside, deal directly with meanings turns out to be something rather like a benign 'user illusion.'") In view of this, it seems appropriate to characterize Dennet's physicalism as a dogmatic presupposition--and such dognatism is hardlyl rendered benign by the fact taht it is farily widespread in the philosophy-of-mind community.
But there is one kind of apporach to these issues that is unlikely to be affected by the views and arguments contained in this book. As an example of this approach, (though by no means not the only one) we may take Daniel Dennett, as he presents himself in his essay in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 1995). He tells us taht, having come to distrust the methods employed by other philosophers, he decided that "before I could trust my intuitions about the mind, I had to figure out how the brain could possibly accomplish the mind's work." This means accepting, right from the outset that the brain is a "syntactic engine" that mimics the competence of "semantic engines. (How we mere semantic engines could ever know what a semantic engine might be is not addressed). All this is dictated by an "initial allegiance....to the physical sciences and the third-person point of view," an allegiance which in turn is justified by appeal to an evolutionary perspective. The foundational commitment to mechanistic materialism is unmistakable. This commitment is subsequently refined and elaborated, but it is never subjected to a fundamental re-evaluation; rather, data that conflict with it are dismissed as illusory. ("This conviction that I, on the inside, deal directly with meanings turns out to be something rather like a benign 'user illusion.'") In view of this, it seems appropriate to characterize Dennet's physicalism as a dogmatic presupposition--and such dognatism is hardlyl rendered benign by the fact taht it is farily widespread in the philosophy-of-mind community.
Meditation in a toolshed
This is the link to Meditation in a Toolshed, which appears in God in the Dock. It prefigures a lot of what we find in Thomas Nagel's "What it is like to be a bat."
Whatever Lord
For Epistles class, I had to come up with an interpretive element for the passage Philippians 4:2-9. It is the last piece of the project which consisted of exegeting the text and writing a sermon. I used Wordle, which shows the most frequent words in larger print. Here are some results:
It has been an especially difficult month
on many levels: physically,emotionally,academically.
I will be glad when the semester is over,as much as
I love my studies,and particularly glad once
internship begins in August. One frustration
has been where we'll live in July. Initially,
we were going to be able to stay in our apartment
on campus until the end of July and then we'd leave
for internship. Now we have a month to be proverbial
vagabonds, moving from place to place--either on
campus or among family and friends.
This has been a time of high anxiety for many of us.
I found the above Wordles particularly helpful to
bring out the themes of the passage. What it all
comes down to is giving it all to God, letting go,
and saying, "Whatever Lord." Now to internalize this
is something else again. As my spiritual director
asked me this morning,"Where have you seen God in
all of this?" I had to admit that God has been
there through it all,but perhaps I have not been
as present to God as I should be. God give us
grace to be who you want us to be and do what
you want us to do. God give us wisdom and your
continued grace.
Driving While Mexican, or it's no fun being an illegal alien (or looking like one either)
All eyes are on Arizona today because Governor Brewer signed Senate Bill 1070, and I feel like putting a paper bag over my virtual head. Police in our state have now been given the authority to demand papers on anyone of whom they have a reasonable suspicion that they are illegal aliens. The trouble is, about the only reason for suspicion that I can think of that someone is in the country illegally is if they have brown skin, or speak Spanish instead of English, or English with an Mexican accent. Last I checked, that was called racial profiling, which is illegal. Supposedly they are going to come up with some guidelines for deciding when there is reasonable suspicion. Good luck with that.
On every police force there are some Mark Fuhrmans. (One of them is our county sheriff). And what will they do if they get a call about loud music late at night, and that music turns out to be Spanish language music? Do you think they're going to resist the temptation to ask for papers?
Illegal immigration is a serious problem. This is a preposterous way to go about stopping it.
On every police force there are some Mark Fuhrmans. (One of them is our county sheriff). And what will they do if they get a call about loud music late at night, and that music turns out to be Spanish language music? Do you think they're going to resist the temptation to ask for papers?
Illegal immigration is a serious problem. This is a preposterous way to go about stopping it.
On The Necessity of Mental Causation
This is from my reply to Keith Parsons in essay "Some Supernatural Reasons Why My Critics are Wrong" (a title that was given to my essay by someone else), in Philosophia Christi (Volume 5, no. 1, 2003).
But think for a moment about wjhat it is to be persuaded by an argument. If we are thinking in common-sense terms, we would hve to say that what goes one when we are persuaded by Parsons's argument that Arizona State will not be in the BCS this year is that we conisder the epistemic strength of the premises, the grounding relation between the premises and the conclusion, and then accept the conclusion as a result of conisdering the evidence presented in the argument. To be convinced by an argument is for the reasons presented in the to play a causal role in the production of the belief. If the argumetn is causally irrelevant to the belief, then we cannot say that the argument was persuasive. This can often be cashed out counterfactually: If I really am persuaded by Parsons's arugment, then it cannot be the case that I am such a partisan of the Arizona Wildcats that I would think the worst of the Sun Devils' prospects even if the Sun Devils had a Heisman trophy candidate at quarterback, oustanding and experienced running backs and wide receivers, a rock-solid offensive line, and was returning everyone from what had been the stingiest defense in the Pac-10 the previous year.
On the one hand, the reasons have to persuade me in virtue of their being reasons. The logical force of the argument has to have a causal impact on belief. It has to make a difference as to whether I form the belief or fail to form the belief in question. And that, by the way, is bound to make a difference as to what I do with my body. I am going to behave differently if I think the Devils have a good chance to take the Pac-10 title than if I don't. And that is going to affect what the particles in the physical world do. But if the physical is causally closed, that means that only the physical can affect where the particles in the physical world go, and, the physical is defined as lacking, at the basic level of analysis, the central features of the mental. So the only way this kind of causal relation could possibly exist, would be if we could analyze the mental in physical terms as a kind of macro-state of the physical. Just as the word "planet" is absent from physical vocabulary, but a whole bunch of particle-states add up to there being a planet, perhaps "S's belief that P" can be added up from a set of physical states. But that seems to me to be just impossible. Add up the physical all you like, and you aren't going to get "S's belief that P." The physical leaves the mental indeterminate. Yet, if science is to be possible, is has to be determinate whether, for example, Einstein is plussing or quussing when he is adding numbers in the course of developing his theory.
So, I argue that you need mental causation for the possibility of science, but you can't get that without affirming what seems to be an implausible reductionism, that conflicts with the indeterminacy of the physical.
But think for a moment about wjhat it is to be persuaded by an argument. If we are thinking in common-sense terms, we would hve to say that what goes one when we are persuaded by Parsons's argument that Arizona State will not be in the BCS this year is that we conisder the epistemic strength of the premises, the grounding relation between the premises and the conclusion, and then accept the conclusion as a result of conisdering the evidence presented in the argument. To be convinced by an argument is for the reasons presented in the to play a causal role in the production of the belief. If the argumetn is causally irrelevant to the belief, then we cannot say that the argument was persuasive. This can often be cashed out counterfactually: If I really am persuaded by Parsons's arugment, then it cannot be the case that I am such a partisan of the Arizona Wildcats that I would think the worst of the Sun Devils' prospects even if the Sun Devils had a Heisman trophy candidate at quarterback, oustanding and experienced running backs and wide receivers, a rock-solid offensive line, and was returning everyone from what had been the stingiest defense in the Pac-10 the previous year.
On the one hand, the reasons have to persuade me in virtue of their being reasons. The logical force of the argument has to have a causal impact on belief. It has to make a difference as to whether I form the belief or fail to form the belief in question. And that, by the way, is bound to make a difference as to what I do with my body. I am going to behave differently if I think the Devils have a good chance to take the Pac-10 title than if I don't. And that is going to affect what the particles in the physical world do. But if the physical is causally closed, that means that only the physical can affect where the particles in the physical world go, and, the physical is defined as lacking, at the basic level of analysis, the central features of the mental. So the only way this kind of causal relation could possibly exist, would be if we could analyze the mental in physical terms as a kind of macro-state of the physical. Just as the word "planet" is absent from physical vocabulary, but a whole bunch of particle-states add up to there being a planet, perhaps "S's belief that P" can be added up from a set of physical states. But that seems to me to be just impossible. Add up the physical all you like, and you aren't going to get "S's belief that P." The physical leaves the mental indeterminate. Yet, if science is to be possible, is has to be determinate whether, for example, Einstein is plussing or quussing when he is adding numbers in the course of developing his theory.
So, I argue that you need mental causation for the possibility of science, but you can't get that without affirming what seems to be an implausible reductionism, that conflicts with the indeterminacy of the physical.
Neutral Monism
Neutral monism was described in my comment box as follows:
1. the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or proto-phenomenal attributes (alternatively: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).
I'm just not sure this position hangs together. It looks like your explanatory chain has to terminate with a reason, or else it has to terminate wtih something that is not a reason.
I found an interesting Edward Feser blog post on this.
1. the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or proto-phenomenal attributes (alternatively: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).
I'm just not sure this position hangs together. It looks like your explanatory chain has to terminate with a reason, or else it has to terminate wtih something that is not a reason.
I found an interesting Edward Feser blog post on this.
Physicalism, mental causation, and the AFR
There are, of course, several versions of the AFR. If the opponent is advocating some kind of reductionism, then all the difficulties in providing a naturalistic account of intentionality come into play.
If the opponent is a non-reductivist, they are basically giving up on the idea of coming up with an analysis of intentionality in physical terms. Instead, they guarantee intentionality through a supervenience relation. Now, this doesn't explain intentionality, because we apparently are not told why this relation exists. It strikes me as a kind of necessity-of-the-gaps response, a kind of mystery maneuver. To the question "why are there genuine intentional states, and real conscious persons, as opposed to just behavior that looks intentional or conscious" the nonreductivist really isn't providing any answer.
I think a physicalist has to be bothered by the fact that they are positing a supervenience relation as an ultimate brute fact, even though it isn't a physical brute fact. So, I wanted to pose some problems for the ontological status of supervenience itself, which strikes me as questionable.
But, there has always been a recognized problem for the nonreductivist in the area of mental causation. If they physical is causally closed, that means nothing non-physical can cause anything. Now cause-and-effect relations between mental states seem to me to be necessary for the possibility of science. Einstein has to do the math, and his doing the math has to cause him to propose his theory. Without mental causation, it cannot be true of us that we literally add, subtract, multiply, and divide numbers, much less analyze Maxwell's equations. And yet physical states, not mental states, do the causal work in the materialist's universe.
If the opponent is a non-reductivist, they are basically giving up on the idea of coming up with an analysis of intentionality in physical terms. Instead, they guarantee intentionality through a supervenience relation. Now, this doesn't explain intentionality, because we apparently are not told why this relation exists. It strikes me as a kind of necessity-of-the-gaps response, a kind of mystery maneuver. To the question "why are there genuine intentional states, and real conscious persons, as opposed to just behavior that looks intentional or conscious" the nonreductivist really isn't providing any answer.
I think a physicalist has to be bothered by the fact that they are positing a supervenience relation as an ultimate brute fact, even though it isn't a physical brute fact. So, I wanted to pose some problems for the ontological status of supervenience itself, which strikes me as questionable.
But, there has always been a recognized problem for the nonreductivist in the area of mental causation. If they physical is causally closed, that means nothing non-physical can cause anything. Now cause-and-effect relations between mental states seem to me to be necessary for the possibility of science. Einstein has to do the math, and his doing the math has to cause him to propose his theory. Without mental causation, it cannot be true of us that we literally add, subtract, multiply, and divide numbers, much less analyze Maxwell's equations. And yet physical states, not mental states, do the causal work in the materialist's universe.
On trying to get things right: Why I think the New Atheism is bound to backfire
A redated post.
When I was a young Christian I read some anti-religious writings like those of Bertrand Russell, and I found that as brilliant as he might have been in other respects, he made no attempt to get anything right about his believing opponents.
Dawkins seems to be proud of not taking his opponents seriously. See here.
I went onto the Dawkins site and found that people who write books critical of the New Atheists referred to as fleas, and my book was mentioned as one of Dennett's fleas.
Look, I went through an entire Ph.D level education in philosophy from undergrad on up in secular philosophy departments. I can tell you that the failure to take theistic perspectives seriously in response to them left me unimpressed with the religious skepticism of many of my professors. Some, of course, were notable exception. When you read a book by Russell on why he isn't a Christian and he can't get Aquinas' cosmological argument even close to right, it makes you think that a lot of unbelief is fueled by personal hostility rather than careful evaluation. In some classes the impression I got was everyone was supposed to assume that the case against religious belief was made on the day you were absent. "Well, of course, we've grown up." "Everybody is a materialist." Etc. Etc. Etc.
At the same time, I encountered Christian after Christian of undeniable intellect and intellectual fairness. They may not be right, but I found it hard to believe that refuting them was a slam dunk.
Going around saying that the emperor has no clothes on is quite different from providing real arguments. For this reason I think the New Atheists' strategy is bound to backfire. They don't have to be nice, they do have to take the time and effort to understand positions they don't like.
People who take completely opposed positions to my own have praised my fairness. How many Dawkins opponents have said that about him?
P. S. I put the link on the title.
When I was a young Christian I read some anti-religious writings like those of Bertrand Russell, and I found that as brilliant as he might have been in other respects, he made no attempt to get anything right about his believing opponents.
Dawkins seems to be proud of not taking his opponents seriously. See here.
I went onto the Dawkins site and found that people who write books critical of the New Atheists referred to as fleas, and my book was mentioned as one of Dennett's fleas.
Look, I went through an entire Ph.D level education in philosophy from undergrad on up in secular philosophy departments. I can tell you that the failure to take theistic perspectives seriously in response to them left me unimpressed with the religious skepticism of many of my professors. Some, of course, were notable exception. When you read a book by Russell on why he isn't a Christian and he can't get Aquinas' cosmological argument even close to right, it makes you think that a lot of unbelief is fueled by personal hostility rather than careful evaluation. In some classes the impression I got was everyone was supposed to assume that the case against religious belief was made on the day you were absent. "Well, of course, we've grown up." "Everybody is a materialist." Etc. Etc. Etc.
At the same time, I encountered Christian after Christian of undeniable intellect and intellectual fairness. They may not be right, but I found it hard to believe that refuting them was a slam dunk.
Going around saying that the emperor has no clothes on is quite different from providing real arguments. For this reason I think the New Atheists' strategy is bound to backfire. They don't have to be nice, they do have to take the time and effort to understand positions they don't like.
People who take completely opposed positions to my own have praised my fairness. How many Dawkins opponents have said that about him?
P. S. I put the link on the title.
Reply to some questions from J on the AFR
Why can't matter...think, or possess intentionality of some type, to varying degrees ? (widely varying).
The problem is that something can count as material only if, at the basic level, there is no intentionality, no purpose, no normativity, and no subjectivity. If you want to tamper with that definition of matter, be my guest, but that seems to be built into the very idea. Remember Dennett's "no skyhooks" rule? Yet, somehow the truths about thinking have to follow necessarily from truths about what by definition MUST be nonmental. Such entailments, in my view, are bound to break down logically. We can hide the breakdown in pages and pages of neuroscientific analysis, but at the end of the day there is no entailment, no metaphysical glue that binds the mental and the physical together. Whatever glue we come up with, if we analyze it closely enough, has to come from a mind of some sort, and materialism fails.
In comparison to say, ants, rats seem nearly conscious.
Which of the four relevant properties do they have, or do they lack them all?
Does a rose bush think? It does know when to bloom... At least a rose follows a routine (even if genetically determined).
Does the thermostat in my house know how hot or cold it is?
either way the mere fact of intentional processes--or consciousness-- does not suffice as proof of monotheism...
Monotheism is one of a few options left over once naturalism is eliminated. As Lewis recognized, it is not the only one.
The problem is that something can count as material only if, at the basic level, there is no intentionality, no purpose, no normativity, and no subjectivity. If you want to tamper with that definition of matter, be my guest, but that seems to be built into the very idea. Remember Dennett's "no skyhooks" rule? Yet, somehow the truths about thinking have to follow necessarily from truths about what by definition MUST be nonmental. Such entailments, in my view, are bound to break down logically. We can hide the breakdown in pages and pages of neuroscientific analysis, but at the end of the day there is no entailment, no metaphysical glue that binds the mental and the physical together. Whatever glue we come up with, if we analyze it closely enough, has to come from a mind of some sort, and materialism fails.
In comparison to say, ants, rats seem nearly conscious.
Which of the four relevant properties do they have, or do they lack them all?
Does a rose bush think? It does know when to bloom... At least a rose follows a routine (even if genetically determined).
Does the thermostat in my house know how hot or cold it is?
either way the mere fact of intentional processes--or consciousness-- does not suffice as proof of monotheism...
Monotheism is one of a few options left over once naturalism is eliminated. As Lewis recognized, it is not the only one.
Russell's Syndrome
This is an excellent piece of terminology, from Janes Hannam.
Blair’s conversion led to one columnist making a fool of himself. Matthew Parris, who is usually quite sensible, has a bad case of Russell’s syndrome. Regular readers will know that this condition afflicts men and women of high intelligence who are, in most respects, indistinguishable from their fellow members of the academic elite. However, the sufferer of Russell’s Syndrome (first identified in the third Earl [Bertrand] Russell), looses (sic) all his common sense, discrimination and reason when his mind turns to religion.
Blair’s conversion led to one columnist making a fool of himself. Matthew Parris, who is usually quite sensible, has a bad case of Russell’s syndrome. Regular readers will know that this condition afflicts men and women of high intelligence who are, in most respects, indistinguishable from their fellow members of the academic elite. However, the sufferer of Russell’s Syndrome (first identified in the third Earl [Bertrand] Russell), looses (sic) all his common sense, discrimination and reason when his mind turns to religion.
Upholding Us in Prayer
"Pray in the Spirit at all times in every prayer and supplication. To that end keep alert and always persevere in supplication for all the saints" (Eph 6:18 NRS).As a second year student, I am among those who have been blessed by the prayers of the faithful people of Zion Lutheran Church. Shortly after my classmates and I began our seminary journey we heard that these folks would like to pray for us. We each have a specific person who has been praying for each of us over the nearly two years we've been here.
Last year they came to visit us here at the seminary and today we had the opportunity to visit and worship with them. It was such a blessing. My prayer partner was unable to join the group that visited us last year. Today I had the privilege of meeting her and thanking her for her prayers. It makes such a difference to know their support and faithfulness as they carry our needs to God.
Today, as we gathered together we were refreshed and nourished in prayer, fellowship, God's Word, and the Holy Supper. Our fellowship together continued over a wonderful lunch as well. Thanks be to God for the these wonderful gifts.
WHAT'S SIOP, DOC?
THE "SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN" is America's blueprint for waging nuclear warfare if - and God forbid - it becomes necessary. Data comprising the latest intelligence estimates of world tension, upheaval, known and estimated nuke cpbilities of various nations, etc; are reviewed by "president" Obama and the Joint Chiefs and thed fed into a supercomputer which then wages virtual nuclear war using several scenarios and spits out casualty estimates for each possibility. It was highly secret until yesterday.
Yesterday, "president" Obama issued a directive stating that the United States would NOT use nukes in self defense in a multitude of scenarios wherein their use would formerly have been justified.
This is right up on the line of treason. Obama has just revealed a big part of the SIOP.
Let me be very clear here and also very careful not to advocate treason myself.
Barack Hussein Obama should be immediately be arrested for treason. He should then be tried, and convicted in a competent Court of Law for treason. And then he should be sentenced to and put to death in the manner prescribed by law. For treason.
Now I know there is but a snowball's chance in hell of this happening, and I m not advocating extra-legal means nor the overthrow of the government. But I am by God saying that Obama is a criminal. Right this red-hot minute, we still have the ballot. If it was not evident before, then unless you are blind it is eviodent now, and it stinks to high Heaven.
Yesterday, "president" Obama issued a directive stating that the United States would NOT use nukes in self defense in a multitude of scenarios wherein their use would formerly have been justified.
This is right up on the line of treason. Obama has just revealed a big part of the SIOP.
Let me be very clear here and also very careful not to advocate treason myself.
Barack Hussein Obama should be immediately be arrested for treason. He should then be tried, and convicted in a competent Court of Law for treason. And then he should be sentenced to and put to death in the manner prescribed by law. For treason.
Now I know there is but a snowball's chance in hell of this happening, and I m not advocating extra-legal means nor the overthrow of the government. But I am by God saying that Obama is a criminal. Right this red-hot minute, we still have the ballot. If it was not evident before, then unless you are blind it is eviodent now, and it stinks to high Heaven.
THE CASE FOR CHRISTIANITY: WHY BELIEVE?
IN DISCUSSIONS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, I HAVE ASKED VARIOUS FOLKS WHY THEY BELIEVE AS THEY DO. I HAVE HEARD ANSWERS SUCH AS "BECAUSE I PREFER TO BELIEVE IN A GOD WHO IS KIND" OR "BECAUSE (INSERT NAME OF RELIGION) PROMOTES (INSERT IDEAL OR IDEALS). I SCARCE EVER HEAR SOMEONE GIVE THE ONLY VALID REASON FOR BELIEVING ANYTHING, Which is "because it is true".
Now, Christianity consists of the belief that Jesus of Nazareth is Jehovah God; that He became a human being born of a virgin and the Holy Spirit; that He lived and died as the perfect Lamb of God to take away the sins of the world; and that he was raised from the dead on the third day, and lives forever and will soon return.
So the question must be "why do I believe this is true?"
Since today is Easter, I think it a fine time to answer that. The linchpin of Christian belief being that of the Resurrectiion. Without the Resurrection the rest is mostly just twaddle and adages. With it, you have the Truth. To arrive at the Truth, you must have evidence. Here it is.
EXHIBIT A: JESUS TOLD EVERYONE HE WOULD DIE AND RISE FROM THE DEAD. This was as well known in that day as Barack Obama's election is in ours. People were looking for this event.
EXHIBIT B: JESUS'S ENEMIES PLOTTED TO KEEP THE RESURRECTION FROM HAPPENING. They did this by sealing the tomb and posting a guard of Roman soldiers on it, in case Jesus' disciples tried to steal the body and point to the empty tomb. What chance would a collection of unarmed fishermen, townspeople and women have against Roman Legionnaires?
EXHIBIT C: IF JESUS'S ENEMIES WANTED TO DISCREDIT HIM - WHICH THEY VEHEMENTLY DID - ALL THEY NEEDED TO DO WAS PRODUCE HIS CORPSE AFTER THE THIRD DAY. They could not, because He had risen.
EXHIBIT D: JESUS SHOWED HIMSELF ALIVE AFTER HIS DEATH. The evidence for this is in the next Exhibit:
EXHIBIT E: ("E" stands, of course, for "Easter"). Jesus's Disciples went far and wide telling everyone of having seen, first hand, His Resurrected Self. This did not sit well with those who hated the new religion, Notable among these was the Roman Emperor Nero. Nero offered St. Peter and St. Paul a choice: Either renounce their belief that Jesus had risen from the dead; and in that case go free as wealthy men; or else maintain that they had seen Jesus alive after the Crucifixion, in which case they would die horribly by torture. Now if you had been confronted on a lie and given the choice of sticking to the lie and dying slowly and painfully OR publicly admitting that you had been putting everyone on, well, if you say you would die under torture for a frivolous con game, you are either lying or you are nuts. Peter and Paul were not the only ones, either.
So that is why I believe in Christianity. The evidence that it is true is absolutely irrefuteable.
Now, Christianity consists of the belief that Jesus of Nazareth is Jehovah God; that He became a human being born of a virgin and the Holy Spirit; that He lived and died as the perfect Lamb of God to take away the sins of the world; and that he was raised from the dead on the third day, and lives forever and will soon return.
So the question must be "why do I believe this is true?"
Since today is Easter, I think it a fine time to answer that. The linchpin of Christian belief being that of the Resurrectiion. Without the Resurrection the rest is mostly just twaddle and adages. With it, you have the Truth. To arrive at the Truth, you must have evidence. Here it is.
EXHIBIT A: JESUS TOLD EVERYONE HE WOULD DIE AND RISE FROM THE DEAD. This was as well known in that day as Barack Obama's election is in ours. People were looking for this event.
EXHIBIT B: JESUS'S ENEMIES PLOTTED TO KEEP THE RESURRECTION FROM HAPPENING. They did this by sealing the tomb and posting a guard of Roman soldiers on it, in case Jesus' disciples tried to steal the body and point to the empty tomb. What chance would a collection of unarmed fishermen, townspeople and women have against Roman Legionnaires?
EXHIBIT C: IF JESUS'S ENEMIES WANTED TO DISCREDIT HIM - WHICH THEY VEHEMENTLY DID - ALL THEY NEEDED TO DO WAS PRODUCE HIS CORPSE AFTER THE THIRD DAY. They could not, because He had risen.
EXHIBIT D: JESUS SHOWED HIMSELF ALIVE AFTER HIS DEATH. The evidence for this is in the next Exhibit:
EXHIBIT E: ("E" stands, of course, for "Easter"). Jesus's Disciples went far and wide telling everyone of having seen, first hand, His Resurrected Self. This did not sit well with those who hated the new religion, Notable among these was the Roman Emperor Nero. Nero offered St. Peter and St. Paul a choice: Either renounce their belief that Jesus had risen from the dead; and in that case go free as wealthy men; or else maintain that they had seen Jesus alive after the Crucifixion, in which case they would die horribly by torture. Now if you had been confronted on a lie and given the choice of sticking to the lie and dying slowly and painfully OR publicly admitting that you had been putting everyone on, well, if you say you would die under torture for a frivolous con game, you are either lying or you are nuts. Peter and Paul were not the only ones, either.
So that is why I believe in Christianity. The evidence that it is true is absolutely irrefuteable.
Please Pray for Flooded RI
RI has experienced the worst flooding in over 100 years. We have friends and family there and would appreciate your prayers. Yesterday, the governor declared a state of emergency. The situation is very desperate.Thank you.